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Social influence plays an important role in human behavior and 
decisions. The sources of influence can be generally divided into 
external, which are independent of social context, or as originating 
from peers, such as family and friends. An important question is how 
to disentangle the social contagion by peers from external influences. 
While a variety of experimental and observational studies provided 
insight into this problem, identifying the extent of social contagion 
based on large-scale observational data with an unknown network 
structure remains largely unexplored. By bridging the gap between 
the large-scale complex systems perspective of collective human 
dynamics and the detailed approach of the social sciences, we 
present a parsimonious model of social influence, and apply it to a 
central topic in political science elections and voting behavior. We 
provide an analytical expression of the county vote-share 
distribution in a two-party system, which is in excellent agreement 
with 92 years of observed U.S. presidential election data. Analyzing 
the social influence topography over this period reveals an abrupt 
transition in the patterns of social contagion from low to high levels 
of social contagion. The results from our analysis reveal robust 
differences among regions of the United States in terms of their 
social influence index. In particular, we identify two regions of ‘hot’ 
and ‘cold’ spots of social influence, each comprising states that are 
geographically close. These results suggest that social contagion 
effects are becoming more instrumental in shaping large scale 
collective political behavior, which is at the core of democratic 
societies. 
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Introduction
The understanding of collective human dynamics in real-life social systems 
gained increasing attention in recent decades (1-3). At the core of these efforts 
are models that incorporate a collection of interconnected individuals that 
change their behavior based on micro-level processes of social influence exerted 
by their neighbors, but also based on individuals’ personal influences 
independent of social context. The macro-level characteristics of the system 
emerge as a product of the collective dynamics of these personal influences and 
micro-level social influence processes. The question of how to separate and 
measure the effect of social influence is therefore a major challenge for 
understanding collective human behavior. Although a variety of experimental 
(4-8) and observational (9-12) studies attempted to address this challenge, 
identifying the extent of social influence based on large-scale, macro-level 
observational data in the presence of unknown network structure remains 
largely unexplored. To close this gap, we present a simple and universal 
method for measuring social influence, taking the voter model of statistical 
physics as our basic dynamical system (1, 13-15). We apply our model to 
understanding the collective dynamics of voting in US presidential elections a 
topic at the core of collective political behavior.  
 The study of electoral behavior has attracted considerable attention by 
political scientists. Most studies of voting behavior in the United States and 
other democracies view vote choices as the result of several interrelated 
attitudinal and social factors (16). Attitudinal factors that reflect shortóterm 
fluctuations in partisan division of the vote include evaluations of the 
candidates' personal qualities and government performance, and orientations 
toward issues of public policy. Long-term factors, which persist beyond a 
particular election, include partisan loyalties (17, 18), ideological orientations 
(19), and social characteristics such as race, religion, social class, and region 
(16). Recent studies have also elucidated the role of social networks in 
spreading voting behavior (20). Voters embedded in social networks of friends, 
family members, neighbors, and co-workers (8) influence each other in terms of 
voter turnout (8, 21-23) or support particular candidates (20, 24). Social 
networks enable bounded rational voters to limit the cost of searching for 
political information (19) by relying on readily available information of their 
peers. Other sources of political information that were shown to influence 
citizen attitudes and voting behavior are the mass media (25-29) and a variety 
of organized efforts at political persuasion such as campaign persuasion (30). 
 Thus the picture that emerges from the modern history of social science 
academic voting research suggests that voters are embedded in interpersonal 
social networks that can increase the likelihood of voting contagion and 
behavior change; but are also exposed to what we might call external influences 
affecting their vote decision independent of peer influence. As mentioned above, 
these external (non-network) influences include various attitudes and 
orientations, party identification, ideology, campaign persuasion, and exposure 
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to the mass media, such as television and newspapers. The external influences 
are often skewed in favor of one candidate over another (20). Collectively, the 
voter’s electoral decision can be explained in terms of peer effects and partisan 
biases conveyed by competing external influences.  
 A pertinent question here is how to disentangle the effect of social 
contagion from that of exposure to external influences. This identification 
problem goes beyond voting. People hold opinions on a multitude of topics that 
inform alternative courses of action, from crime participation (31) and smoking 
(32) to riots and protests (33) and financial crises (34). These opinions can be 
either the result of individual considerations or, when confronted with 
information that is difficult to acquire or process, influenced by the views of 
others through social interactions. In this paper we describe a general 
methodology for detecting behavioral contagion from large-scale observational 
data. To this end, we take the voter model (1, 13-15) as our basic dynamical 
system, and extend it to take into account the dynamic response of social 
networks to external influences. Our model focuses on two characterizations of 
voting behavior. The first is that of most studies of voting behavior, which 
consider vote choices to be driven, as outlined above, by various attitudinal 
factors and other external pressures. The second from complex systems 
science and recent observational and face-to-face studies is that of internal 
self-reinforcing dynamics where voters’ opinions are changed under the 
influence of their peers. Incorporating both, we construct a universal 
representation of the largest scale system behavior when there is both external 
and interpersonal influence. The extended voter model is able to reproduce 
remarkably well statistical features and patterns of almost a century of county-
level U.S. presidential election data. More importantly, our model presents a 
general framework for detecting social contagion from large-scale election 
return data, and can be applied more generally to many different systems that 
involve social contagion.  
 Here, electoral votes cast for U.S. presidential candidates at the county 
level are analyzed, covering the period of 1920 through 2012. Counties are 
grouped by state, and the corresponding distributions of the fraction of votes 
(vote-share) in a county for the Democratic candidate in an election year are 
studied. Fig. 1 shows the county vote-share distributions for various states and 
election years. The data indicates that there is a wide variation in the 
characteristics of voting behavior with no apparent pattern of voting dynamics 
in time or geographical space. Here we show that much of this observed 
variability of county vote-shares may be best explained by fluctuating peer 
influences across time and space. Although the study of collective opinion 
dynamics, including voting behavior, has been the focus of discussion in the 
context of modelling and identification of universal patterns of behavior (35-
45), the mechanisms leading to the diverse spatiotemporal variation in voting 
patterns shown in Fig. 1 are poorly understood. The model presented below 
provides a parsimonious quantitative framework that is capable to explain and 
4 
 
reproduce the full range of empirical county vote-share distributions for all 
states and election years. Using the model, we develop an index of social 
influence that enables us to examine and reveal remarkably robust patterns of 
spatial and temporal variation in social influence over 92 years of US 
presidential elections.    
 
 
Fig. 1. Observed county vote-share distributions, 1920-2012. The 
observed distributions of Democratic vote-share per county are presented for 
states with the greatest number of counties, for each of the nine census 
divisions established by the U.S. Census Bureau. Here plots are shown for 
various presidential elections from 1920 to 2012. The vote-share per county is 
measured as the percentage of the vote in the county received by the 
Democratic candidate. The figure shows the plot of the cumulative 
distributions. The insets show the corresponding probability density functions 
(for clarity the x-scale has been shifted to right and contracted). Curves are 
based on kernel estimation with Gaussian kernels. 
Results 
Model of voting contagion under external influences 
To model the dynamics of elections, we consider a network with  nodes 
representing voters, and links between pairs of nodes representing interpersonal 
influence among voters. To represent external influences, we add nodes that 
influence others, but are not themselves influenced, i.e. “fixed” nodes. The 
number of fixed nodes that are biased in favor of the first candidate (named ‘0’)
is and the number biased in favor of the second candidate (named ‘1’) is 
. The effective strength of the external influences biased towards the two
candidates is given by the number of these nodes. Thus, we consider a network 
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with õ õ nodes. Each node has an internal state which can take only 
the values ð and ï, representing whether the voter chooses the first or second 
candidate; or, for fixed nodes, whether the node is biased in favor of the first or 
second candidate. We assume that the  nodes (voters) change their 
internal state according to a dynamical rule: At each time step a random free 
node is selected and its state is updated with probability ï  by copying the 
state of one of its connected neighbors, chosen at random from all nodes; and 
with probability  the state remains the same. The  and  nodes that are 
biased towards the first and second candidate remain fixed in state ð and state 
ï, respectively. Copying the state of a connected free node represents mutual 
influence among friends, neighbors, and family members; while copying from a 
fixed node represents the influence of external factors such as exposure to mass 
media, candidate qualities, issue orientation, the incumbent party's 
performance in office; or deep-rooted values that define and shape an 
individual’s party identification and ideology. Analytically extending and 
to non-integer values enables modeling arbitrary relative strength of 
external to internal influence (see Materials and Methods). The number of 
fixed nodes can be interpreted in several ways: Fixed nodes can be viewed as 
autonomous voters who do not observe their neighbors' vote choices. 
Accordingly, the number of fixed nodes may reflect the proportion of the 
electorate with very weak or no ties to other members of a social network; or as 
the proportion of the electorate who are “opinion leaders” who interpret media 
messages and pass them on to "opinion followers" (17). The number of fixed 
nodes can also be seen as a device for representing the external forces that 
inhibit the effect of peer influence, such as party identification, ideology or any 
other source of political information  this is the view that we shall adopt here. 
We note that in this model external influences of opposite partisan biases do 
not cancel; instead larger and reflect increasing probability that external
influences determine the choices of voters independent of the voting behaviors 
of others. The model assumes that there are many external sources of 
competing political information, and that over the election period in question 
the sources are persistent in their proportion of partisan biases regarding the 
two-major party candidates though vary in the way they influence individual 
voters’ choices. Election years that are consistently biased towards the first 
(second) party’s candidate would be represented by  greater (smaller) than 
. We have previously proposed this model as a widely applicable theory of 
collective behavior of complex systems (14-15, 46-48). Here we extend the 
model to divulge the phenomenology of voting contagion in electoral voting 
behavior. Successful matching to election data will also be a confirmation of the 
universality of this theory.  
 The behavioral model can be solved exactly for a fully connected network. 
At equilibrium, the probability of finding the network in the global state of  
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voters in state ï (i.e. voting for candidate 1) is given, independently of the 
initial state, as follows (see derivation in Materials and Methods):  
              ø ÷ ã ò                                            Å Ã 
where  is the number of voters,  is the number of voters is state 1 and  
are binomial coefficients. Analytically extending  and  to non-integer 
values enables modeling arbitrary relative strength of external to internal 
influence (see Materials and Methods). In this case, the solution in Eq. 1 
remains the same, with the difference that factorials must be replaced by 
gamma functions. Indeed, as we move around in the ø ô ÷-parameter space,
the stationary distribution in Eq. 1 exhibits strikingly different shapes
depending on the strength of the external forces, and , compared to the 
strength of interactions within the network, and the relative bias of the 
external influence toward the first or second candidate from skewed unimodal 
distributions with intermediate peaks to peaks at all nodes ï or all nodes ð to 
bimodal and uniform distributions (see Fig. 6 in Materials and Methods). 
Interestingly, Eq. 1 remains valid for other network topologies if and are 
re-scaled according to the degree distribution (see Materials and Methods).   
In this paper we are mostly interested in the fraction of voters (vote-share) 
that voted for a candidate rather than the actual number of voters. Thus, we 
define the vote-share for candidate ï as the scaled variable ã . The mean 
and variance of  can be computed from Eq. 1 as follows 
                               ã
õ
                                                                Å Ã 
ã
øï ÷
 
õ õ ï
õ
õ
õ õ ï
                         Å Ã 
The variance of vote-shares in Eq. 3 has an appealing interpretation. When 
peer influences are very weak compared to external forces ( ô ), the 
variance of vote-shares becomes ã øï ÷ . This is the variance of 
vote-shares that one would expect if all voters make independent decisions, 
each with probability . The second term on the right side of Eq. 3 is a 
decreasing nonlinear function of the external influence parameters, and thus 
provides us with a way of detecting and isolating the effect of social contagion. 
This index can be applied to understanding how social influence changes across 
states and over election years. 
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The unknown external influence parameters and for any state in any 
election year can be estimated using the sample vote-shares across counties as 
follows. Suppose a particular state has  counties, and let  be the fraction of 
voters in the county that voted for candidate 1, and be the total number 
of votes cast for all candidates in the county. We assume that all counties are 
influenced by the same external parameters and that the distribution is in 
equilibrium. Using these assumptions, we view each county as a subnetwork 
with  nodes and external parameters  and . Using Eq. 2, the mean of 
vote-shares in county  does not depend on , and is equal to ã ã
ø õ ÷. We thus estimate  by simply taking the sample average  of 
vote-shares across all  counties. For the variance of vote-shares in county 
, a crude estimate based on the single observed vote-share data point  is 
provided by ø ÷ . Obviously, this estimate is imperfect and we define the 
residual between  and the estimate of  
       
                              ã ø ÷                               Å Ã 
 
Using Eqs. 3 and 4, we define a system of nonlinear estimation equations that 
relates ø ÷ , the estimate of , to the external influence parameters  
and : 
   
ø ÷ ã
øï ÷
õ õ ï
õ  
õ
õ õ ï
 õ    ã ïô ô         Å Ã 
The estimation procedure first estimates  on the right hand side of Eq. 5 by 
, and then select the sum of parameters õ that minimizes  in 
Eq. 5. The least squares estimate is given by 
õ
ã
øï ÷ õ
ø ÷
øï ÷
ï
ø ÷
øï ÷
ï
õ ø ÷ õ øï ÷
ï ø ÷
           Å Ã 
Eq. 6 and the condition ã õ  fully determine the estimated 
external influence parameters. We can use Eq. 3 and the estimate in Eq. 6 to 
obtain an index of social influence for each state in each election year: 
 
õ õ ï
õ 
õ
õ õ ï
                  Å Ã 
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where ã is the average number of voters per county.
For the U.S. presidential elections from 1920 to 2012, we find that 
ô ï for all states and across election years. Driven by this fact and the 
fact that the total number of voters in any county in any given election 
year is large, we obtain in the limit that the stationary distribution in 
Eq. 1 is approximately a Gaussian distribution (see Materials and Methods). 
More specifically, we approximate the asymptotic vote-share distribution in 
county  by a Gaussian ø ÷ ã ï î ø ÷ with mean ã ã
ø õ ÷ and variance ã øï ÷ õ . In our case we observe 
the vote-shares of  different counties of a state, and are interested in the 
probability distribution of observations across all counties (see Fig. 1). A 
plausible model for this distribution of vote-shares  per county is to describe it 
as a Gaussian scale mixture (49) with  different components (representing 
counties), each distributed as a normal distribution with the same mean  and 
variance , as specified above. This mixture is unimodal with a mode at , 
skewness value ã ð, kutosis value ã í , and variance 
ã . Using the Pearson system, the Gaussian scale mixture can be 
approximated by a Student's distribution (50). More specifically, let the 
vote-share per county in the state be a Gaussian mixture of  components 
with equal mean . Let ã  î øë ç÷ and ã ø í÷ øë ç÷ be 
the Pearson coefficients, ã øï ÷ , and ã øï ÷ . Then, the 
scaled and shifted mixture ø ÷ is approximately distributed as a Student's 
distribution with  degrees of freedom (50). Notice that ô ô ô ô ô  and 
 are functions of the external influence parameters , , the number of 
counties  in the state, and the total number of votes  in each county, and 
thus can be estimated from them. A main result of our paper is that for all 
states and across election years the number of degrees of freedom ïðð, 
and thus the scaled and shifted vote-share ø ÷ is predicted to approach 
the standard normal distribution. 
Empirical results of US presidential elections: 1920 to 2012  
Our analysis is based on US presidential election data from 1920 to 2012 (51). 
States with less than 10 counties (i.e., Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, and 
Rhode Island) and Washington D.C. were excluded from analysis. For each 
state, in every election year, the data includes information on the number of 
counties  for which vote-share data was available, the vote-share in county 
, and the total number of votes cast for all candidates in county , . The 
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external influence parameters and , and the distribution parameters 
and  were estimated for all states and every election year. Using these 
parameters, we constructed the probability distribution of the scaled and 
shifted vote-share quantity ø ÷, and compared it with the predicted 
normal distribution. Figure 2 shows that this theoretical prediction fits 
remarkably well for most states and election years, representing almost a 
century of county-level U.S. presidential election data, and is consistent with 
observations in other countries (52).  
 We can use the index of social influence defined in Eq. 7 to examine the 
level of social interactions across states and election years. In the upper panel 
of Figure 3 we show the histogram of the social influence index aggregated over 
all states and election years. The histogram shows a right-skewed log-normal-
like distribution. This means that while the bulk of the distribution occurs for 
small values of social interactions, the electorate in US presidential elections is 
at times highly volatile and subject to wide swings of social contagion effects 
higher than the typical value. This is reflected by the highly right-skewed tail 
of the histogram. Here we find that the log-logistic provides a slightly better fit 
relative to the log-normal distribution. The log-logistic is a heavy-tailed 
distribution similar in shape to the log-normal distribution, but with heavier 
tails (53). 
   
 
Fig. 2. Scaled vote-share distributions and predicted curves, 1920-
2012. Without loss of generality, curves are presented for states with the 
greatest number of counties in each of the four census regions—Northeast, 
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Midwest, South, and West—of the U.S. The figure shows the plot of the 
cumulative distributions. Observed values (dashed lines) are based on kernel 
estimation with Gaussian kernels. Solid lines are Gaussian distributions with 
mean 0 and variance 1. The scaled vote-shares are calculated from the 
estimated external influence parameters and . The goodness of fit of the 
Gaussian relative to the empirically observed county vote-share distributions 
was determined by using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The fit of the model is 
excellent the test fails to reject the normality null hypothesis at the ëû 
significance level, for çëû of all states in all election years; and at the ïû 
significance level, for çèû of all states in all election years.  
   
Fig. 3. Distributions of Social Influence and best-fit curves, 1920-
2012. The upper and middle panels of Figure 3 show the histogram and 
cumulative distribution of the Social Influence index (using Eq. 7), aggregated 
over all states and election years. The lower panel shows the spread of the 
Social Influence index. The broad distributions are best fitted by the log-
logistic distribution, often used for analyzing skewed data. The goodness of fit 
of the log-logistic distribution was determined by using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test. The fit of the model is very good (° ã ðòïê). 
 To analyze the electoral dynamics, we examine the spatial and temporal 
variation in social influence from 1920 to 2012. First, we examine the evolution 
of social influence over time. Fig. 4 shows the time series of the average social 
influence for each of the nine U.S. census divisions (panels a-f) along with the 
time series of (normalized) social influence averaged over all U.S. states (panel 
g). To enable the comparison of the various time series, all data are normalized 
scores. Specifically, for each individual time series we express the social 
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influence in terms of standard deviation from their mean, calculated from 1920 
to 2012. We use hierarchical clustering to identify clusters of U.S. census 
divisions with the highest within-cluster time-series correlation and the greatest 
between-cluster time-series variability. The result from the hierarchical 
clustering suggests three clusters: two main clusters (arranged in panels d and 
f) with within-cluster average correlations of 0.824 and 0.909, and a relatively 
high between-cluster average correlation of 0.775; and a singleton cluster (New 
England) with a relatively low between-cluster average correlation of 0.1071. 
Remarkably, we find that despite variations in social influence across states 
and divisions, the normalized time series pertaining to the overwhelming 
number of states (with the exception of the three-state region of New England 
analyzed here) collapse on a very similar curve. Indeed, as can be seen, the 
normalized curves in panels d and f show a very similar pattern, which is also 
similar to the observed temporal pattern of social influence when averaged over 
all states (Fig. 4g). That is, the pattern in Fig. 4g shows a monotonic upward 
trend, which means that social influence increases through time (Mann-Kendall 
test, é ïð ). Moreover, the period of 1984 2012 displays much higher 
levels of social influence when compared with the period of 1920 1980, which 
displays lower levels of social influence (Mann-Whitney U-test, ° ä ïòí ïð , 
see Fig. S1). New England is an apparent exception to this pattern (Fig. 4a-b). 
However, this exception may be explained by the historical events and our 
model. One of the most unique characteristics that makes  New England, as a 
political region in America, different from other regions is its town meeting 
form of government a local institution that did not spread to other states 
(54). The town meeting is the legislative assembly of a town in which qualified 
voters make laws in face-to-face communal decision making (54). Town 
meetings defined New England’s politics until the middle decades of the 20th 
century. This was changed in 1962 with the Supreme Court’s “one person, one 
vote” decisions, which resulted in shifting power dynamic away from most small 
towns that practiced town meetings, face-to-face interactions, to cities that 
adopted representative politics (54). Thus the relative high levels of social 
interaction observed in New England prior to the 1960 election (see Fig. 
4b) contrary to the patterns observed in other regions correspond to the 
period in which town meetings a powerful platform of social influence via 
face-to-face, communal, decision making had wide legislative powers. This 
was followed by a sharp decline in relative social influence (see Fig. 4b) after 
the Supreme Court’s “one person, one vote” decision, which had the effect of 
shifting the power from face-to-face communication and social interaction to 
representative politics. This political transition changed not only the relative 
level of social interactions and thus the variability of the vote-share 
distributions but also impacted the partisan bias hence the mean of the 
vote-share distributions towards the Democrats (54).  
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Fig. 4. Evolution of Social Influence, 1920-2012. Time series of social 
influence averaged over states, and their normalized versions (see text), are 
shown for each of the nine U.S. census divisions: a-b) Division 1, New 
England Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont; c-d) Division 
2, Middle Atlantic (Solid line): New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania. 
Division 4, West North Central (Dashed line): Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota and South Dakota. e-f) Division 3, East 
North Central (Solid line): Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio and Wisconsin. 
Division 5, South Atlantic (Dashed line): Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia and West Virginia. Division 6, East South 
Central (dotted line): Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi and Tennessee. Division 
7, West South Central (Dash-dot line): Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma and 
Texas. Division 8, Mountain (Gray solid line): Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, 
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming. Division 9, Pacific: 
Alaska, California, Oregon and Washington (Gray dashed line). The nine U.S. 
census divisions are clustered according to the correlation between their 
respective normalized social influence profiles. The corresponding average 
pairwise correlations are 0.824 and 0.909 for the clusters in Fig. 4c-d and Fig. 
4e-f, respectively. Panel 4g shows the time series of normalized social influence, 
averaged over all U.S. states. The scores are mapped to colors from white 
( ã ïòï, below the mean) to black ( ã îòç, above the mean). A clear pattern 
of high social influence (positive or near-zero scores) follows a period 
(1920 1980) of low social influence (negative scores). The 1984 break date  
separating low from high levels of social contagion is identified by the Mann-
Whitney U-test, which is applied for different potential breaks within the range 
1920-2012 (see Fig. S1).  
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Fig. 5. Spatial variation of social influence and its change over time, 
1920-2012. a) Hot spot analysis of social influence for sample maps of US 
presidential elections (see Figs. S2-S25 and Movie S2 for a complete analysis). 
The colored areas reflect the significance (p-value) of local concentration of 
social influence for each state. The p-values for each state are derived from a 
random permutation test of local clustering using the Getis-Ord Local  
statistic. This analysis was performed with a contiguity spatial weight matrix 
that indicates whether states share a boundary or not. The variable of concern 
is the social influence index calculated using Eq. 7 in the main text.            
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Low p-values (p-value 0.1) indicate statistically significant high levels of social 
influence at a state and its surrounding neighbors (hot spots). High p-values 
(p-value 0.9) indicate statistically significant low levels of social influence at a 
state and its surrounding neighbors (cold spots). b) Heatmap of the correlation 
coefficients between pairs of election years characterized by their state-level 
social influence profiles.  
 
 As a further support for the usefulness and consistency of our model, we 
examine how the spatial variation of social influence across states changes over 
time. We can characterize each election as a vector of state-level indices of 
social influence (using Eq. 7), and measure the similarity between each pair of 
elections by the corresponding correlation coefficient (Fig. 5b). This type of 
analysis, combined with the findings in Fig. 4, reveals intriguing patterns that 
go beyond shortóterm fluctuations in partisan division of the vote. Hierarchical 
clustering of the elections by the social influence correlation distance shows 
several marked clusters of highly similar election years (see Fig. 4b): 
1932 1972, 1984 2012, and three smaller clusters 1920 1924, 1928, and 1976-
1980. Remarkably, these clusters of social interactions correspond nicely with 
the partitioning of American history into distinct party systems (55). 
 There have been six party system periods in American history, separated 
by relatively significant change in party loyalties (55-59). Clustering analysis 
reveals that during 1932-1972, external forces (in the form of attitudes, 
orientations, party identification, or ideology) are strong compared to 
social/peer influences, and indicate a stable long-term electorate phase. This 
result is plausibly supported by the historical account. The stock market crash 
of 1929 and the ensuing depression signaled the realignment of the fifth party 
system from a Republican to Democratic majority with the election of 1932 
and the New Deal coalition (55, 57). The change was also influenced by 
demographic changes of rising American electorate of African Americans, blue 
collar workers, Catholics and urban ethnics, and a shrinking Republican base of 
white Protestants, small town residents, farmers, and middle class businessmen 
(57). The distinction between external and social influence stands despite some 
fluctuations in Republican vs. Democratic selections.  
 The cluster 1976-1980 identified by our clustering analysis (see also Fig. 
5b) suggests that the elections of 1976 and 1980 formed a transition period to 
the post-New Deal era of weakened partisanship among the voters (57). This 
transition period corresponds to the Watergate scandal and Nixon's resignation 
in 1974, and Democrat Jimmy Carter’s victory in the 1976 presidential election. 
 Whereas the previous fifth party system was characterized by strong party 
loyalties and partisan attachments, the sixth party system (overlapping with 
the 1984 2012 cluster in Fig. 5b) is characterized by electoral 
dealignment the weakening of party loyalties among voters (57, 59, 60), 
reduced political involvement (61), and the critical role of voters’ personal 
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social interaction networks in determining vote choices (20). As partisanship 
declined and more voters became independents (55), inter-election vote swings 
increased (57). Moreover, the external influence of television and newspaper 
declined as the media were considerably less likely to be sources of partisan-
biased information (20, 57, 62). This led to a period of strong competition 
where neither Democrats nor Republicans created a true majority party, 
resulting in alternating control of the presidency, split-ticket voting, and 
divided government. These trends seem to be consistent with our model, which 
shows higher levels of social contagion for the 1984 2012 period (Fig. 4g), 
relative to the 1920 1980 period, combined with the long-term stability of 
social influence patterns indicated by the high levels of association between the 
1984 2012 elections (Fig. 5b). The high levels of social interactions observed in 
the 1984 2012 period (Fig. 4g) account for an increasing volatility and 
variability of the vote-share distributions (via Eq. 3). This is seen in the 
historical account: The Republicans won the presidency with the victories of 
Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush in 1980, 1984, and 1988, and regained 
control of the Senate from 1981 to 1987 for the first time in almost 30 years. 
The Democrats regained control of the presidency with Bill Clinton in 1992 
and 1996 whereas the Republicans won control of the Congress from 1994 to 
2006 for the first time in 40 years. In 2000, Republican George W. Bush 
defeated Democratic Al Gore in the closest election in modern U.S. history. 
Although Bush won reelection in 2004, Democrats won control of Congress in 
2006, and Democrat Barack Obama was elected in 2008. Although it would 
seem that Obama's victories in the 2008 and 2012 suggest a critical 
realignment of the party system, the Republicans regained control of the House 
in 2010 by their biggest landslide since 1946, and control of Congress in 2014, 
with the largest Republican majority in the House since 1928.   
 Movie S1 in Supplementary Material shows maps (excluding Alaska and 
Hawaii), color-coded by levels of social influence, for all election years. In order 
to better characterize the spatial patterns of social influence observed in Movie 
S1, we apply a variety of spatial statistical data analysis methods. First, we 
utilized a random permutation test of spatial autocorrelation using the Moran’s 
statistic (63, 64). The random permutation tests suggest (see Table S1) the 
presence of significant positive spatial correlation, for all election years, 
between states’ own levels of social influence and the levels of their neighbors 
as indicated by the level of significance (p-value) shown in the third column of 
Table S1.  This analysis was performed with a contiguity spatial weight matrix 
(row normalized) that indicates whether states share a boundary or not. While 
the Moran’s  statistic indicates that the spatial distribution of high and/or low 
values is more spatially clustered than would be expected if underlying 
processes were random, it does not identify unexpected spatial spikes of high or 
low social influence values. We thus applied random permutation tests of 
spatial clustering using the Getis-Ord General Ù statistic (65, 66). The tests 
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indicate (see Table S2) that social influence is significantly concentrated in 
space as shown by the significance levels (p-value) in the third column of Table 
S2. That is, for all election years, the observed Getis-Ord General Ù is larger 
than the expected General Ù , indicating that the spatial distribution of high 
social influence values is more spatially clustered than would be expected if 
underlying spatial processes were truly random.  
 In order to identify where high or low values of social influence cluster 
spatially, we further applied a random permutation test of local clustering 
using the Getis-Ord Local Ù statistic (65, 66). Low p-values of the random 
permutation test indicate statistically significant high levels of social influence 
at a state and its surrounding neighbors (hot spots). High p-values indicate 
statistically significant low levels of social influence at a state and its 
surrounding neighbors (cold spots). This analysis was performed with a 
contiguity spatial weight matrix that indicates whether states share a boundary 
or not. The corresponding maps of hot spot analysis, for all election years, are 
presented in Figs. S2-S25 and Movie S2. A sample of these maps of social 
influence clusters is presented in Fig. 5a. The colored areas in Fig. 5a reflect 
the significance (p-value) of local concentration of social influence for each 
state, derived from the random permutation test of local clustering using the 
Getis-Ord Local Ù statistic. The maps shown in Fig. 5a (see Figs. S2-S25 and 
Movie S2 for a complete analysis) enable to identify unusual geographical 
concentrations of high or low values (i.e., hot or cold spots) of social influence 
across the United States, for each election year. More specifically, the hotspot 
analysis of US presidential elections from 1920 to 2012 reveals a distinctive 
geographical cluster of states with statistically significant low levels of social 
influence (cold spots). This cluster is comprised of states mainly in the Great 
Plains and West North Central regions (including, for example, Montana, 
Wyoming, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas and Oklahoma). 
Contrastingly, states predominantly in the Middle Atlantic region (New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, and New York) for all election years and states in the Pacific 
region (California, and Oregon) and the Southwest (Arizona and 
Nevada) from 1988 to 2012 display high values of social influence (hot 
spots).  
 It would be interesting to speculate on the political, economic, social, and 
psychological factors that drive geographic variation in voting contagion. 
Research in the geographical and psychological sciences, which examine the 
geographical distribution of political, economic, social, and personality traits 
within the United States (67-72), suggest that the Great Plains and West 
North Central region is characterized by individuals that are typified by 
conservative social values, low openness and resistance to change, and 
preference of familiarity over novelty. This region comprises states with 
comparatively small minority populations (70), is less affluent, has fewer highly 
educated residents, is less innovative compared with other regions, and tends to 
be politically conservative and religious (69). Individual in this region choose to 
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settle near family and friends and maintain intimate social relationships with 
them, but also tend to display low levels of social tolerance and acceptance for 
people who are from different cultures, unconventional, or live alternative 
lifestyles (69). Altogether, the above characteristics indicate a region where 
voters' choices are plausibly based upon strong ideology, party identification, 
orientations and attitudes rooted in religion and traditional social values, and 
reinforced by faceótoóface interactions with likeóminded family members and 
friends. We therefore expect our model to generate a social influence index (see 
Movie S1 for maps of raw social influence values instead of the Getis-Ord Local 
Ù statistic) that reflects external forces (e.g., in the form of party
identification or ideology), which are strong compared to peer influences. 
 Unlike the very low openness and conservative social values typical for the 
Great Plains and West North Central region, states along the Middle Atlantic 
and Southwest region are marked by moderately to very high openness, is 
wealthy, educated, culturally and ethnically diverse, and economically 
innovative (69, 71). This region appears to be politically liberal, and has fewer 
mainline Protestants (69). Residents of this region also appear to be tolerant 
and accepting of social and cultural differences (69). Considering the social 
diversity, tolerance, openness, and open-mindedness in this region, it is 
plausible that people’s orientations and attitudes are influenced by the 
attitudes of others (69). This is consistent with our model, which shows high 
levels of social influence index (see maps of raw social influence values in Movie 
S1) that indicate peer influences that are strong compared to external forces in 
the form of attitudes or ideology. Although further research is needed to 
uncover the factors affecting social influence, it is plausible that economic, 
social, and psychological factors, as discussed above, can explain the 
geographical variability of social influence. 
Discussion
Many complex systems can be viewed as comprising of numerous 
interconnected units (e.g., voters) each of which responds independently to 
external forces (e.g., party identification), but is also affected by the states 
(e.g., opinions) of its connected units (14-15, 46-47). In such systems, the 
distribution of the states of the units (e.g., vote-share distribution) may change 
in characteristic ways depending on the strength of external influences relative 
to internal influences (14-15). Therefore, a key question is how to disentangle 
the effect of internal influences from that of exposure to external influences, 
given observational data about the phenomena we are trying to explain. This 
identification problem is important not only to the biological and physical 
sciences (e.g., ecosystems (73)), but also in the social sciences where the 
importance of social interactions in forming opinions and decisions has been 
emphasized (8, 31-32, 34, 74). The numerous opinions held by people can be 
formed either by information acquired by external sources or, when 
comprehensive search for information is costly, time-consuming, or difficult to 
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acquire or process, formed by the attitudes of their peers in their own personal 
networks.  
 In this paper, we presented a general methodology for quantifying the 
degree of social and peer influence on the basis of given observational data. The 
methodology is based on an extended version of the voter model (14-15) that 
takes into account the effect of external forces, and is applied to a 
comprehensive data of US presidential elections from 1920 to 2012. An essential 
element in the model is social interaction between individual voters. The model 
includes two external influence parameters that reflect the bias in favor of one 
of two candidates. These free parameters are also interpreted as external 
factors that influence voting choices, such as attitudes and orientations, party 
identification, ideology, campaign persuasion, and exposure to television and 
newspapers. In addition to these external factors, voters are also influenced by 
the behavior of others. 
 Our model is validated in several ways. First, we derive the theoretical 
probability distribution of the vote-share per county, and find a remarkable fit 
between the theoretical result and the empirically observed county vote-share 
distributions. Our theoretical result is also consistent with observations in 
other countries (52). To our knowledge this is the first study that provides an 
analytical expression of the county vote-share distribution. Second, we 
examined the temporal dynamics of social influence by calculating the social 
influence index for each state and each election year. Our analysis reveals a 
distinct pattern of increasing social influence over 92 years (1920-2012) of US 
presidential elections. The 1984 election year represents the phase transition 
point from low (1920-1984) to high (1984-2012) levels of social contagion. The 
increasing levels of social influence at presidential elections suggest, in turn, the 
decline of bias induced by external forces (e.g., partisanship among voters), and 
an increasing of independence in voting behavior. Third, we examined how the 
geographic variation across states in social influence changes over time. This 
spatiotemporal analysis enables our model to reproduce two stable long-term 
periods of election years corresponding to two successive long-term periods of 
low and high levels of social contagion, in alignment with the 1984 phase 
transition finding. This suggests a new data-driven, large-scale systems 
approach of characterizing abrupt transitions of political events, which is based 
on critical realignment in the patterns of social contagion. Finally, we use the 
model to map the social contagion geography of the United States. Results 
from spatial analysis reveal robust differences among regions of the United 
States in terms of their social influence index. In particular, we identify two 
regions of ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ spots of social influence, each comprising states that 
are geographically close. We provided some evidence that statewide variation 
in social contagion may be linked to psychological, social, and economic factors.  
 More broadly the results suggest the growing role of social influence and 
contagion in shaping peoples’ behaviors, tastes, and actions in a variety of real-
life situations. Social influence and contagion will likely become increasingly 
evident as our society becomes more interconnected through the information 
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superhighway and transport infrastructure networks. If we want to truly 
understand macro-level collective behavior in human systems and perhaps 
devise ways by which human society can increase its collective wisdom it will 
be important to develop practical and effective methods for measuring and 
monitoring the extent of social influence. 
Materials and Methods
Dynamic network model of voting 
Consider a network representing a county with   nonpartisan voters (variable 
nodes) taking only the values of ð or ï, representing support for candidate 0 or 
1, respectively (e.g., Republican or Democrat). In addition, there are and 
partisan voters (frozen nodes) in state ð and ï, respectively. At each time 
step, a variable node is selected at random; with probability ï  the node 
copies the state of one of its connected neighbors, and with probability  the 
state remains unchanged. The partisan nodes can also be interpreted as 
external perturbations, representing a variety of factors that influence voters’ 
attitudes towards one of the two candidates (e.g., party identification and 
ideology). Analytically extending and  to be real numbers enables 
modeling arbitrary strengths of external perturbations.  
 For a fully connected network the behavior of the system can be solved 
exactly as follows. The nodes are indistinguishable and the state of the network 
is fully specified by the number of nodes with internal state ï. Therefore, there 
are only õ ï distinguishable global states, which we denote ô ã ðô ïô ô ò 
The state has  variable nodes in state ï and   variable nodes in state 
ð. If ø ÷ is the probability of finding the network in state at time , then 
ø ÷ can depend only on ø ÷, ø õ ï÷ and ø ï÷. The probabilities 
ø ÷ define a vector of õ ï components . The dynamics is described by 
the equation 
ø ÷ ã ø ÷ õ
ø ÷
ø ÷
Å ø õ ï÷ õ ø ÷ø õ ï÷Ã   
õ ø ï÷
øï ÷
ø õ õ ï÷
ø õ ï÷ø õ ï÷ 
õ ø õ ï÷
øï ÷
ø õ õ ï÷
ø õ ï÷ø õ ï÷ò 
The term inside the first brackets gives the probability that the state  
does not change in that time step and is divided into two contributions: the 
probability  that the node does not change plus the probability ï  that the 
node does change but copies another node in the same state. In the latter case, 
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the state of the node is ï with probability , and it may copy a different 
node in the same state with probability ø ï õ ÷ ø õ õ ï÷. Also, 
if the state of the selected node is ð, which has probability ø ÷ , it may 
copy another node in state ð with probability 
ø ï õ ÷ ø õ õ ï÷. The other terms are obtained similarly. 
 In terms of , the dynamics is described by the equation 
ã  
øï ÷
ø õ õ ï÷
               Å Ã 
 
where the time evolution matrix , and also the auxiliary matrix , is tri-
diagonal. The non-zero elements of   are independent of  and are given by 
  ô ã î ø ÷ õ ø ÷ õ  
  ô ã ø õ ï÷ø õ ï÷                                  Å Ã  
  ô ã ø õ ï÷ø õ ï÷ 
The transition probability from state to after a time  can be written as 
  
ø ô å ô ð÷ ã                     Å Ã                            
where  and are the components of the right and left -th eigenvectors of 
the evolution matrix, and . Thus, the dynamical problem has been 
reduced to finding the right and left eigenvectors and eigenvalues of the time 
evolution matrix .   
The eigenvalues of  are given by 
              ã ï
øï ÷
ø õ õ ï÷
ø ï õ õ ÷                     Å Ã 
and satisfy ð ï. The equation for ø ô å ô ð÷ shows that the 
asymptotic behavior of the network is determined only by the right and left 
eigenvectors with unit eigenvalue, i.e., by the eigenvector corresponding to 
ã ï. The coefficients of the corresponding (unnormalized) left eigenvector 
are simply ã ï. The coefficients  of the right eigenvector are obtained 
using a generating function technique and an associated nonlinear second order 
differential equation (14-15). The coefficients are then given by the Taylor 
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expansion of the hypergeometric function ø ô ô ï ô ÷ . 
After normalization, these coefficients give the stationary distribution 
             ø ÷ ã ò                                            Å Ã 
This is the probability of finding the network with  nodes in state 1 at 
equilibrium, and it is independent of the initial state. The other eigenvectors, 
corresponding to ï, can also be calculated, and are also related to 
hypergeometric functions (14-15). Although these eigenvectors provide a 
complete description of the dynamics of the network (see Eq. 10), they are not 
particularly illuminating as we are interested in understanding the asymptotic 
behavior of the system ( ã ï÷.
In the thermodynamic limit , we can define continuous variables 
ã ,  ã  and ã  and approximate the asymptotic 
distribution presented in Eq. 12 by a Gaussian ø ÷ ã ï î Å ø ÷ Ã 
with mean ã ø õ ÷ ã ø õ ÷ and variance 
  
               ã
øï õ õ ÷
ø õ ÷
ã øï ÷
ï
õ
õ
ï
                                                         Å Ã
In the limit where ô ï, the width depends only on the ratio 
ã  and is given by øï õ ÷. In particular, for ã ï, the 
width tends to ï î . 
While the model solved above was stated in terms of non-negative integer 
influence parameters ô , it can be generalized to a model where the 
external influence parameters ô  are real numbers. In this case, the 
solution in Eq. 12 remains the same, with the difference that factorials must be 
replaced by gamma functions. Since the numbers ø õ õ ï÷ and 
ø õ õ ï÷ represent the probabilities that a free node (nonpartisan 
voter) copies one of the frozen nodes (partisan voters), small (large) values of 
 and can be interpreted as representing a weak (strong) connection 
between the free nodes and the external system containing the frozen nodes. 
The external system can be thought of as a reservoir that affects the network 
but is not affected by it. 
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Model behavior 
Fig. 6 shows examples of the distribution ø ÷ for a network with ã ëðð and 
various values of and . As we move around in the ø ô ÷-parameter 
space, we observe different types of behavior, which is characteristic of a first-
order phase transition.  
 For ã ã ï, we obtain ø ÷ ã ï ø õ ï÷ for all values of , i.e. 
ã ã ï is the of this model. In this case, all states are 
equally likely and the system executes a random walk through the state space. 
In the limit , ã ã ï marks the transition between disordered and 
ordered states.  
 For ô â ï, we obtain skewed unimodal distributions with peak at 
ø õ ÷ corresponding to the fraction of voters in the network that 
voted for candidate 1. If â , the majority of votes go to candidate 1, and 
if â the majority of votes go to candidate 0. We note that the 
estimation of the influence parameters ô  , based on almost a century of 
US presidential election data, predominantly falls within this regime. For 
ô ï, ø ÷ resembles a Gaussian distribution, and if ã  about half 
the voters vote for candidate 0 and half the voters vote for candidate 1, 
similarly to a magnetic material at high temperatures.  
 For ô  ä ï the bistable (hysteresis) region we obtain bimodal 
distributions in which either of the two network phases can exist, similar to the 
magnetization state in the Ising model below the critical temperature. For 
ã ï, the distribution peaks at all nodes ð or all nodes ï, similar to a 
magnetized state at low temperatures. 
 Finally, for â ïô ä ï or ä ïô â ï, we obtain unimodal 
distributions with peaks at all nodes ï or all nodes ð, respectively.  
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Fig. 6. Stationary distributions for different values of  and . 
Probability distributions of finding the network with  nodes in state 1 at 
equilibrium for different values of and . The number of variable nodes is 
ã ëððò 
Other network topologies
Although the stationary vote-share distribution given by Eq. 12 is obtained 
assuming fully connected networks, it was shown in (14-15) that our exact 
results are excellent approximations for other networks, including random, 
regular lattice, scale-free, and small world networks. These approximations can 
be useful, for example, if our model is applied to a network constructed based 
on online social networks or commuting networks. For these networks, which 
are not fully connected, the effect of the frozen nodes is amplified and can be 
quantified as follows: the probability that a free node copies a frozen node is 
ã ø õ ÷ ø õ õ ÷ where is the degree of the node. We can 
then define effective numbers of frozen nodes in the corresponding fully 
connected network, and , as being the values for which 
õ
ø õ õ ï÷
ã
ø õ ÷
ø õ õ ÷
ø ÷           Å Ã
ø õ ÷
ã
ø õ ÷
                                                   Å Ã
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where the term on the right-hand side in Eq. 14 is the expectation with respect 
to the degree distribution ø ÷, and the term on the left-hand side is the 
probability that a free node copies a frozen node in the corresponding fully 
connected network. Eq. 15 is the mean field boundary condition. For well-
behaved distributions, and can be obtained in terms of central 
moments of the degree distribution by expanding the right-hand side in Eq. 14 
around the average degree  of the real network, as follows: 
õ
ø õ õ ï÷
ã ø ï÷
ø õ ÷
ø õ õ ÷ø ÷
Å Ã
where ã ø ÷ ø ÷ are the central moments of the distribution ø ÷. 
For example, using only the first term in the Taylor expansion gives 
õ õ õ ï ã ø õ ÷ ø õ õ ÷. This 
leads to 
  
ã                ã
 
where ã ø ï÷ . Therefore, as the network acquires more internal 
connections and  increases, the effective values and decrease. 
Supplementary Materials (downloaded at http://bit.ly/2dh0h12) 
Movie S1. Social influence topography of the United States: 1920-
2012. Movie S1 shows maps of social influence for all election years. The 
colored areas are derived from the social influence index calculated using Eq. 7 
in the main text. 
Movie S2. Hotspots of social contagion: 90 years of presidential 
elections. Movie S2 shows colored maps that reflect the significance (p-value) 
of local concentration of social influence for each state. The p-values for each 
state are derived from a random permutation test of local clustering using the 
Getis-Ord Local  statistic. This analysis was performed with a contiguity 
spatial weight matrix that indicates whether states share a boundary or not. 
The variable of concern is the social influence index calculated using Eq. 7 in 
the main text. Low p-values (p-value 0.1) indicate statistically significant high 
levels of social influence at a state and its surrounding neighbors (hot spots). 
High p-values (p-value 0.9) indicate statistically significant low levels of social 
influence at a state and its surrounding neighbors (cold spots). 
Fig. S1. Testing for a break in the level of social influence using the 
Mann-Whiney U-test.  
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Fig. S2. Hot spot analysis of social influence: 1920 US presidential 
election.  
Fig. S3. Hot spot analysis of social influence: 1924 US presidential 
election. 
Fig. S4. Hot spot analysis of social influence: 1928 US presidential 
election.  
Fig. S5. Hot spot analysis of social influence: 1932 US presidential 
election. 
Fig. S6. Hot spot analysis of social influence: 1936 US presidential 
election. 
Fig. S7. Hot spot analysis of social influence: 1940 US presidential 
election. 
Fig. S8. Hot spot analysis of social influence: 1944 US presidential 
election. 
Fig. S9. Hot spot analysis of social influence: 1948 US presidential 
election. 
Fig. S10. Hot spot analysis of social influence: 1952 US presidential 
election. 
Fig. S11. Hot spot analysis of social influence: 1956 US presidential 
election. 
Fig. S12. Hot spot analysis of social influence: 1960 US presidential 
election. 
Fig. S13. Hot spot analysis of social influence: 1964 US presidential 
election. 
Fig. S14. Hot spot analysis of social influence: 1968 US presidential 
election. 
Fig. S15. Hot spot analysis of social influence: 1972 US presidential 
election. 
Fig. S16. Hot spot analysis of social influence: 1976 US presidential 
election. 
Fig. S17. Hot spot analysis of social influence: 1980 US presidential 
election. 
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Fig. S18. Hot spot analysis of social influence: 1984 US presidential 
election. 
Fig. S19. Hot spot analysis of social influence: 1988 US presidential 
election. 
Fig. S20. Hot spot analysis of social influence: 1992 US presidential 
election. 
Fig. S21. Hot spot analysis of social influence: 1996 US presidential 
election. 
Fig. S22. Hot spot analysis of social influence: 2000 US presidential 
election. 
Fig. S23. Hot spot analysis of social influence: 2004 US presidential 
election. 
Fig. S24. Hot spot analysis of social influence: 2008 US presidential 
election. 
Fig. S25. Hot spot analysis of social influence: 2012 US presidential 
election. 
Table S1. Results of random permutation tests of spatial 
autocorrelation using Moran’s statistic. 
Table S2. Results of random permutation tests of spatial clustering 
using Getis-Ord General G* statistic. 
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